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A young child has little choice but to repose his or her 
trust with a parent or parental figure.  When such a 
person abuses that trust, he commits two wrongs, the first 
by sexually abusing the child, the second by using the 
child’s dependency and innocence to prevent recognition 
or revelation of the abuse.  This may be accomplished by 
enforcing secrecy around the acts or even by teaching the 
child that the sexual acts are normal or necessary to the 
relationship.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last six months an unthinkable child sexual abuse 
scandal has unfolded.  Numerous courageous people have come 
forward to confront the painful issue of their sexual abuse by a 
clergy member when they were children.  Tragically, we have 
learned that some of the abuse could have been prevented if 
church officials had responded appropriately to their knowledge of 
certain priests’ dangerous propensities toward children.  The 
scandal has helped raise awareness of the prevalence and damaging 
effects of childhood sexual abuse.  However, in many states, the law 
remains inadequate to address the issue or is applied incorrectly. 
This comment begins by discussing the life-shattering damage 
that child sexual abuse has on victims.  Next, it discusses the history 
of the delayed discovery rule and in particular its history in 
Minnesota.2  Further, this comment examines the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s recent application of the delayed discovery statute 
in D.M.S. v. Barber,3 where the court approved its previous disregard 
of the clear language of the delayed discovery statute in Blackowiak 
v. Kemp4 and also pronounced a new rule that the delayed discovery 
statute does not begin to run until age eighteen.5  Finally, this 
 
 1. Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 2. Delayed discovery is a doctrine stating that a statute of limitations does 
not begin to run when the victim is injured, as most statutes of limitations do, but 
at the discovery of some event. 
 3. 645 N.W.2d 383, 389-90 (Minn. 2002). 
 4. 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996). 
 5. See D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390. 
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comment briefly examines how courts from states other than 
Minnesota have correctly applied delayed discovery statutes, and 
the recent recognition by both the Connecticut and California 
legislatures that childhood sexual abuse is a uniquely damaging 
and heinous crime. 
II. CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE 
A.  Prevalence 
Approximately twenty percent of Americans have been 
sexually abused as children.6  This means almost sixty million living 
Americans are child molestation victims.7 
B.  Secrecy 
Childhood sexual abuse may be one of the most under-
reported crimes in the United States.8  Under-reporting is so 
prevalent that virtually every state, including Minnesota,9 has 
enacted a mandatory reporting statute that makes it a crime for 
certain people associated with children to not report suspected 
child abuse to the proper authorities.10 
There are numerous reasons for the under-reporting of 
childhood sexual abuse.11  Almost all childhood sexual abuse instills 
 
 6. MEI LING REIN, CHILD ABUSE BETRAYING A TRUST 64-65 (John F. McCoy et 
al. eds., 2001) (citing a December 1995 Gallup Poll Monthly which asked 1,000 
adults if “before the age of eighteen were you personally ever touched in a sexual 
way, or ever forced to touch an adult or older child in a sexual way); see also 
William Holmes, Sexual Abuse of Boys: Definition, Prevalence, Correlates, Sequelae, and 
Management, 281 JAMA 1855, 1855-62 at  
http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v280n21/rfull/jrv80046.html#a2 (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2003)(examining 149 previous studies of male sexual abuse and 
concluding that one in five boys had been abused). 
 7. U.S. Census Bureau Homepage, at 
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2003) 
(using current estimate of U.S. population). 
 8. MARGARET O. HYDE & ELIZABETH H. FORSYTH, M.D., THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF 
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 10 (1997). 
 9. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 3(a) (2001). 
 10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL 
CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFORMATION, CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT STATE STATUTE SERIES: COMPENDIUM OF LAWS, at 
http://www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/stats02/mandrep.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 
2003). 
 11. See DALE ROBERT REINERT, SEXUAL ABUSE AND INCEST 34-38 (1997). 
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confusion, guilt, and shame in victims, which makes them feel that 
they are somehow at fault for the abuse or that it was not abuse at 
all.12  Often, abusers tell their victims to keep the “relationship” 
secret.13  Other times, the adult abuser manipulates the child victim 
to think that the relationship is built on mutual love for one 
another, rendering the victim powerless to report the abuse.14  A 
young child who is sexually abused often lacks the verbal ability to 
adequately convey what occurred.15  Sometimes the abusers go so 
far as to explicitly or implicitly threaten the victims.16  The threat 
could be harm to the victim, harm to the victim’s family or friends, 
or even some twisted form of retribution by a higher power, e.g., 
going to hell.17  Even in the absence of a threat, adolescents who do 
find the courage to tell someone about the abuse often find that 
the listener is horrified, disgusted, or even in disbelief.18  All of 
these consequences and realities of childhood sexual abuse lead to 
its significant under-reporting. 
C.  Effects 
Some of the effects of sexual abuse do not become 
apparent until the victim is an adult and a major life 
event, such as marriage or birth of a child, takes place.  
Therefore, a child who seemed unharmed by childhood 
abuse can develop crippling symptoms years later and can 
have a difficult time connecting his adulthood problems 
with his past.19 
The effects of childhood sexual abuse are numerous.20  They 
are not only immediately experienced by many survivors in 
different ways, but often later manifest themselves in a variety of 
 
 12. See MIC HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS 80-82 (1991). 
 13. REINERT, supra note 11, at 34-35. 
 14. MAXINE HANCOCK & KAREN BURTON MAINS, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: HOPE 
FOR HEALING 33 (1987) (citing Mary Ellen Siemers, Treatment Methods for Adult 
Female Survivors of Incest: A Review of The Literature 11-13 (1986) (unpublished 
master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin)). 
 15. HYDE & FORSYTH, supra note 8, at 10. 
 16. HANCOCK & MAINS, supra note 14, at 33. 
 17. REINERT, supra note 11, at 35 (noting that abusers use all types of threats 
to keep the abuse secret). 
 18. HANCOCK & MAINS, supra note 14, at 33. 
 19. HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59. 
 20. See e.g., SUSAN MUFSON, C.S.W., & RACHAEL KRANZ, STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT 
CHILD ABUSE 74-75 (1991). 
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forms.21  Possible effects include lowered self-esteem, suicidal 
impulses, feelings of shame and guilt, aggression, eating disorders, 
running away, distrust of authority and authority figures, tendency 
to be involved with abusive relationships, offender behavior, feeling 
hopeless or helpless, difficulty in forming trusting, intimate 
relationships, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.22 
Survivors of sexual abuse often develop defenses, such as 
denial, disassociation, and memory repression to deal with ongoing 
or past sexual abuse.23  “Because . . . defenses operate mostly on an 
unconscious level, . . . [survivors of sexual abuse] will probably 
remain unaware of them.”24  While these defenses operate to shield 
survivors of sexual abuse from the pain of the past, they 
unfortunately hinder the ability of a survivor to live a full and 
happy life.25  Further, these defenses make it almost impossible for 
victims of sexual abuse to connect the damage and turmoil in their 
lives with the sexual abuse that they suffered as children.26 
D.  Childhood Sexual Abuse By Clergy 
There has not yet been any comprehensive study to examine 
the prevalence of childhood sexual abuse by clergy.27  However, it is 
estimated that about six percent of all U.S. Catholic clergy have 
engaged in sexual activity with a minor.28  There are approximately 
 
 21. See generally REINERT, supra note 11, at 36-37. 
 22. See generally WAYNE KRITSBERG, THE INVISIBLE WOUND: A NEW APPROACH TO 
HEALING CHILDHOOD SEXUAL TRAUMA 56-57 (1993) (listing secondary effects of 
sexual abuse); MUFSON, supra note 20, at 74-75 (listing various effects of sexual 
abuse); REIN, supra note 6, at 71-72 (discussing various studies which examined 
effects of childhood sexual abuse); REINERT, supra note 11, at 36-37 (listing signs of 
sexual abuse). 
 23. KRITSBERG, supra note 22, at 56-57 (describing memory repression as the 
memory loss of the abuse as a result of the overwhelming emotional state during 
the abuse; describing disassociation as feeling disconnected or numb when 
recalling the abuse; describing denial as minimization or complete un-
acknowledgement of logic or actual memories of abuse). 
 24. Id. at 48. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59-60. 
 27. Alan Cooperman, Does Catholic Church Have Greater Problem With Sexual 
Abuse than Other Religions?, WASH. POST, March 16, 2002, at  
http://www.detnews.com/2002/religion/0203/24/religion-441972.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2003).  In the article, Rev. Rossetti stated “[y]ou can’t take [a sample 
of] 1,200 males and ask them, ‘[h]ow many of you have committed child abuse?’ 
and expect to get a true answer.”  Id. 
 28. Marilyn Elias, Is Homosexuality to Blame for the Church Scandal?, U.S.A. 
TODAY, July, 15, 2002, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/2002-07-15-church-
5
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60,000 active and inactive Catholic priests29 and brothers30 in the 
United States today.31  This estimate indicates that approximately 
3,000 to 4,000 priests and brothers have engaged in sexual activity 
with a minor.32  This is a staggering number, especially when viewed 
in light of the fact that most child molesters prey on numerous 
victims.33 
A survivor of sexual abuse by a clergy member may suffer 
effects beyond those discussed above.  Priests are highly respected 
authority figures, particularly among Catholic families.  Survivors 
may experience a deeper lack of respect for authority as a result of 
the abuse by a clergy member.  They may also experience a lack of 
faith and religious belief.  Finally, many survivors of sexual abuse by 
priests are just now learning that often church officials, aware of 
some priests’ abusive propensities, could have prevented the abuse.  
The realization of this betrayal causes additional harm and injury to 
those survivors. 
III. THE DELAYED DISCOVERY RULE 
A.  History 
The United States Supreme Court first applied the delayed 
discovery rule in Urie v. Thompson.34  In Urie, a railroad worker 
alleged that he had inhaled silica dust and as a result suffered 
injuries that were manifested years later.35  Had the Court decided 
that the statute of limitations started to run when the railroad 
worker first inhaled the dust, his claims would have been barred.36  
The Court stated, “[w]e do not think the humane legislative plan 
 
gay_x.htm (citing a study done by A.W. Richard Sipe, psychotherapist and ex-
priest, who has done what’s believed to be the longest-term, largest study on 
priests’ sexuality, following 1,000 priests for up to twenty-five years). 
 29. A priest is a clergyman or minister authorized to carry out the Christian 
ministry.  AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 961 (1963). 
 30. A brother is a man who devotes himself to the duties of a religious order.  
Id. at 153. 
 31. See generally Elias, supra note 28. 
 32. See Tom Economus, Catholic Pedophile Priests: The Effects on U.S. Society, at 
http://www.thelinkup.com/stats.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2003). 
 33. See REINERT, supra note 11, at 22 (stating that perpetrators often affect 
many children in the perpetrator’s life). 
 34. 337 U.S. 163 (1949). 
 35. See id. at 165-66. 
 36. See id. at 169. 
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intended such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance.”37  
The Court concluded that “the afflicted employee can be held to 
be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious 
substance manifest themselves.”38 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s a movement to raise 
awareness about the prevalence of sexual abuse swept the nation 
and brought about discussion of the applicability of the delayed 
discovery rule to cases of sexual abuse.  Many states reacted by 
enacting some type of delayed discovery statute for claims 
specifically based upon sexual abuse.39  These statutes have 
generally gone beyond the “manifestation” test articulated in Urie, 
and have recognized that even if injuries are present, sex abuse 
victims have a difficult time connecting the perpetrator’s wrongful 
conduct as the cause of their psychological injury.40 
B.  Minnesota Delayed Discovery Statute 
The Minnesota delayed discovery statute was enacted in 1989.41  
It states, in pertinent part, that “an action for damages based on 
personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be commenced within 
six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that 
the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.”42  The statute also states: 
“[t]his section does not affect the suspension of the statute of 
limitations during a period of disability under section 541.15.”43  
Finally, the statute states that it applies both to the person who 
 
 37. Id. at 170. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Anne Greenwood Brown, Sometimes the Bad Guy Wins: Minnesota’s Delayed 
Discovery Rule, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 401, 413 (1997) (citation omitted); see also 
infra, notes 225-30, discussing other states’ treatment of the statute of limitations 
for claims based on childhood sexual abuse. 
 40. See generally infra, notes 225-30. 
 41. 1989 Minn. Laws, ch. 190, § 2 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 
541.073 (2002)). 
 42. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2 (2002).  Originally, the statute provided for 
a two-year statute of limitations for claims based upon intentional acts and six 
years for claims based upon negligent acts.  See MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1990), 
amended by Act of May 28, 1991, ch. 232, § 1, 1991 Minn. Laws 629, 629.  In 1991, 
the legislature erased the distinction between claims based upon intentional acts 
and claims based upon negligent acts, making both subject to a six-year statute of 
limitations.  See Act of May 28, 1991, ch. 232, § 1, 1991 Minn. Laws 629, 629 
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 541.073, subd. 2 (1992)). 
 43. Id. at subd. 2(d).  The disability statute serves to prevent an applicable 
statute of limitations from running when a victim is under a disability such as 
minority or insanity.  See MINN. STAT. § 541.045 (2002). 
7
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committed the abuse and the person(s) who negligently permit the 
sexual abuse to occur.44 
C.  Statutory Analysis of the Minnesota Delayed Discovery Statute 
The role of the court in statutory analysis is to discover and 
effectuate the legislature’s intent.45  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
concluded that “where the legislature’s intent is clearly discernable 
from the plain and unambiguous language [of a statute], statutory 
construction is neither necessary nor permitted.”46  Words and 
phrases are to be interpreted according to their plain meaning.47  
Further, it is a basic maxim of statutory construction that “a statute 
is to be construed, if possible, so that no word, phrase, or sentence 
is superfluous, void, or insignificant.”48 
In interpreting the delayed discovery statute, the first question 
is the meaning of “knew or had reason to know.”49  This generally 
requires an objective examination of what a reasonable person 
would have known in the plaintiff’s circumstances.50  Hence, the 
standard is what a reasonable person who was sexually abused when 
he or she was a child would have known.51  This examination is a 
question of fact for the jury.52  After determining that the inquiry is 
objective, the next question is what must the victim know or have 
reason to know.  The statute clearly states that a victim must know 
or have reason to know 1) that he or she was abused, 2) that he or 
she was injured, and 3) that the injury was caused by the sexual 
abuse.53  If the victim does not have knowledge of all three 
elements, the statute clearly should not begin to run.54  Obviously, 
 
 44. Id. at subd. 3. 
 45. Lino Lakes Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Reiling, 610 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. 
2000) (interpreting zoning statutes). 
 46. Am. Tower, L.P., v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001) 
(quoting Ed Herman & Sons v. Russell, 535 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1995)); see 
also MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2000). 
 47. Am. Tower, 636 N.W.2d at 806. 
 48. Duluth Fireman’s Relief Ass’n v. Duluth, 361 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 
1985). 
 49. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2. 
 50. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3; W.J.L. v. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Minn. 
1998) (stating that “application of a reasonable person standard” is necessary). 
 51. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. 
 52. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680; Bertram v. Poole, 597 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1999). 
 53. See MINN. STAT. § 541.073. 
 54. See id. 
8
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if the legislature intended the statute to run at the time the victim 
knew of any of the three elements individually, then it would not 
have required discovery of all three in the statute.55 
IV. THE MINNESOTA COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE  
DELAYED DISCOVERY STATUTE 
A.  History 
The Minnesota Supreme Court first interpreted the delayed 
discovery statute in 1996 in Blackowiak v. Kemp.56  Blackowiak 
alleged that he was sexually abused by Kemp, his school 
counselor.57  The allegations stemmed from incidents that took 
place when Blackowiak was eleven years old, twenty-two years 
before suit was commenced.58  Blackowiak testified that as an adult 
he did not tell his counselor about the sexual abuse because he was 
ashamed of it.59  Furthermore, Blackowiak testified that at age 
twenty-two he “freaked out” when he encountered Kemp (the 
perpetrator) accompanying a young boy.60  However, Blackowiak 
testified that at that time he still did not even acknowledge to 
himself that Kemp had sexually abused him.61  Blackowiak also 
testified that until 1991, a year before bringing suit, he never 
thought about the abuse and didn’t want to think about it.62 
The court held that Blackowiak’s claims were barred by the six-
year statute of limitations in the delayed discovery statute because 
the evidence “overwhelmingly demonstrate[d] that he knew of the 
sexual abuse long prior to 1986 [more than six years before 
commencing suit].”63  The court based its decision on the fact that 
 
 55. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4 (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (laying out the 
three elements of the delayed discovery statute). 
 56. 546 N.W.2d 1. 
 57. Id. at 2.  Blackowiak alleged that on one occasion at Kemp’s cabin, Kemp 
forced him to have oral and anal intercourse with him.  Id.  Blackowiak further 
alleged that he believed there were other incidents of abuse, but because he 
suffered from traumatic amnesia, he could not remember any of them.  Id. at 2. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  Blackowiak stated that he freaked out because he assumed that Kemp 
was sexually abusing the young boy.  Id. 
 61. Blackowiak, 528 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. 
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Blackowiak felt shame64 about the abuse and because Blackowiak 
freaked out upon seeing Kemp with a young boy, even though 
there was evidence that Blackowiak did not acknowledge that Kemp 
abused him until 1991.65  The court stated that “as a matter of law, 
one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually abused,” based upon the 
observation that in liability insurance disputes criminal sexual 
conduct is such that an intention to inflict injury can be inferred as 
a matter of law.66  The court concluded that the ultimate question 
then under the delayed discovery statute was not the “manifestation 
and form of the injury [which] is significant to the victim,” but 
rather “the time at which the complainant knew or should have 
known that he/she was sexually abused.”67 
Two years after Blackowiak, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
again had the opportunity to interpret the delayed discovery statute 
in W.J.L. v. Bugge.68  At age thirty-three, W.J.L. brought suit alleging 
that Bugge, one of her female high school teachers, sexually 
abused her.69  According to W.J.L., the alleged abuse began more 
than fifteen years earlier while W.J.L. was a junior in high school.70  
W.J.L. stated that Bugge repeatedly told W.J.L. that she (W.J.L.) 
“was a lesbian and that their relationship was therapeutic.”71  W.J.L. 
recalled being confused by the relationship, but did not realize that 
it was sexual abuse at the time.72  Further, W.J.L. testified that it was 
not until 1992 (less than six years from commencement of the 
suit), when she read the book The Prince of Tides, which referenced 
same-sex rape, that she realized that she had been sexually 
abused.73  Finally, expert testimony on W.J.L.’s behalf showed that a 
 
 64. Shame is an emotion of self-blame.  It would seem too obvious to note 
that a victim who feels “shame” about an assault has not discovered that it was the 
perpetrator rather than the victim who engaged in wrongful or tortuous conduct.  
Thus, feelings of “shame” are not evidence that the plaintiff discovered that 
he/she was sexually abused. 
 65. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. 
 66. Id. (citing Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Minn. 
1982)).  The court concluded that “concepts of sexual abuse and injury within the 
meaning of this statute are essentially one and the same, not separable.”  Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 573 N.W.2d 677, 681-82 (Minn. 1998). 
 69. W.J.L. v. Bugge, No. C6-96-1619, 1997 WL 30721, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Jan. 28, 1997) (W.J.L. commenced suit on February 2, 1995). 
 70. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d. at 678-79.  W.J.L. was approximately sixteen years 
and eleven months old when the abuse began in 1978.  Id. at 679. 
 71. Id. at 679. 
 72. Id. at 682. 
 73. Id. at 679. 
10
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reasonable person in W.J.L.’s circumstances would not have known 
that she was sexually abused until 1992.74  Reaffirming Blackowiak’s 
holding that “one is injured if one is sexually abused,” the Bugge 
court held that W.J.L.’s claims were time barred on W.J.L.’s twenty-
fifth birthday.75  Even though W.J.L. offered evidence showing that 
she did not recognize the nature of the abuse, that she did not 
recognize the extent of the injury, and that a reasonable person in 
W.J.L.’s situation would not know that he or she was sexually 
abused until 1992, the court concluded that W.J.L. “failed to 
present specific facts giving rise to a genuine issue of material 
fact.”76 
Justice Gardebring dissented in both Blackowiak and Bugge,77 
reasoning that the plain meaning of the delayed discovery statute 
“demonstrates that it is knowledge of causation which triggers the 
6-year limitation period, not merely knowledge that sexual abuse 
occurred.”78  Further, Justice Gardebring noted that the clear 
legislative intent behind the delayed discovery statute was to 
provide those abused as children additional time to become aware 
of the link between the abuse and the emotional injuries, which 
often occurs much later in life.79 
B.  Post Bugge Decisions 
Not surprisingly, in the wake of Blackowiak and Bugge, lower 
courts have had difficulty applying the clear language of the 
delayed discovery statute in conjunction with the supreme court 
precedent.80  Shortly after Bugge, the court of appeals had an 
opportunity to apply the statute in J.J. v. Luckow.81  In J.J., the 
 
 74. Id. at 682. 
 75. Id. at 681-82.  The court held that under MINN. STAT. § 
541.15(a)(1)(2000) the six-year statute of limitations in MINN. STAT. § 541.073 
does not begin to run until one year after the plaintiff reaches the age of majority.  
Id. 
 76. Id. at 682. 
 77. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 682-84; Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3-4.  Justice Blatz 
joined in the Bugge dissent.  573 N.W.2d at 684. 
 78. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See e.g., Doe 28B v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, No. C9-99-
2164, 2000 WL 781362, at *2-4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2000); Brett v. Watts, 601 
N.W.2d 199, 203-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Bertram, 597 N.W.2d at 312-16; J.J. v. 
Luckow, 578 N.W.2d 17, 19-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 81. 578 N.W.2d at 19-21. 
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plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by a police officer.82  
The plaintiff commenced his action when he was twenty-four years 
old.83  Instead of using the age twenty-five rule applied in Bugge, the 
J.J. court construed the delayed discovery statute to give a survivor 
of childhood sexual abuse six years from the age of majority to 
bring any claims based upon the alleged abuse.84  As a result, the 
court held that the plaintiff’s claims were barred because he failed 
to commence his action before his twenty-fourth birthday.85 
A little over a year after J.J., the court of appeals again 
confronted the delayed discovery statute in Bertram v. Poole.86  In 
Bertram, two sisters, Katie and Jeannette, alleged that their uncle 
abused them when they were children.87  At the commencement of 
the suit, Katie was twenty-four and Jeannette was twenty-five.88  
Basing its decision on Bugge, a different panel of judges from that 
in J.J. concluded that a survivor of sexual abuse has until age 
twenty-five, not twenty-four, to bring a claim based upon that 
abuse.89  Accordingly, the court held that based solely on the 
delayed discovery statute, absent anything else, Katie’s claims would 
be timely, whereas Jeannette’s claims would be barred.90  Bertram 
also held that memory repression in the case of childhood sexual 
abuse tolls the statute of limitations until the victim remembers the 
abuse.91  As a result, the court remanded the case for “the 
determination of whether . . . Katie and Jeannette suffered from 
memory repression.”92 
Subsequent to Bertram, the court of appeals decided Brett v. 
 
 82. Id. at 18-19. 
 83. Id. at 18. 
 84. Id. The court concluded that no construction of the delayed discovery 
statute in the current case without adding the year addition of the infancy statute 
would allow the plaintiff’s claim to stand.  Id.  The court then concluded that the 
plaintiff’s cause of action was barred on his twenty-fourth birthday, more than a 
month before he commenced his suit.  Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 597 N.W.2d at 309-16. 
 87. Id. at 311.  One of the sisters alleged that she became pregnant twice and 
twice her uncle, a doctor, aborted the pregnancies.  Id. 
 88. Id. at 314. 
 89. Id. at 313-14.  Judge Foley dissented and argued that the reference in the 
delayed discovery statute to the disability statute only gives a survivor of sexual 
abuse until age nineteen to bring a claim.  Id. at 314-16. 
 90. Id. at 314. 
 91. Id. at 312. 
 92. Id. at 314. 
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Watts.93  In Brett, Melissa Brett suffered injuries from being hit in 
the head by a softball.  Melissa’s doctor sexually abused her from 
the time she was sixteen years old until she was twenty-one.94  
Under the guise of examination and treatment, the doctor made 
Melissa close her eyes and jump up and down on one leg, while 
only wearing her underwear, ran a pinwheel over the woman’s legs 
and breasts, touched her breasts, and stayed in the room while she 
was undressing and dressing.95  The abusive nature of the conduct 
was unbeknownst to Melissa until she discovered that the doctor 
was doing similar things to other women.96  Suit was commenced 
after Melissa turned twenty-four years old.97  The court did not even 
address the issue of whether Melissa’s claims were barred by the six-
year delayed discovery statute of limitations and allowed her claim 
to proceed on the merits.98  It is unclear whether the court applied 
the Bugge standard, or instead determined that the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run until Melissa knew that she had 
been abused.99 
The court of appeals again reviewed the delayed discovery 
statute a year after Brett in Doe 28B v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & 
Minneapolis.100  Doe 28B involved two men, John Doe 28B and John 
Doe 28A, who alleged that they had been abused as boys by two 
clergymen, one being Father Ronan Liles.101  The record showed 
John Doe 28A first recognized and started having nightmares about 
the abuse in 1991.102  He also stated that as time went on the 
nightmares became more detailed and at one point the face of 
Father Liles came into his nightmare.103  The record also showed 
that John Doe 28B wrote a letter to Father Liles in 1994 that stated 
he was having bad dreams for years, lied to his wife about the 
dreams, and tried to forget about the abuse.104 
The court concluded that the plaintiffs “were always seriously 
 
 93. 601 N.W.2d 199, 199-204 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 94. Id. at 200. 
 95. Id. at 200-01. 
 96. Id. at 201. 
 97. Id. at 200. 
 98. See id. at 199-200.  It is also possible that this defense was never raised and 
therefore was not before the court of appeals. 
 99. See id. 
 100. No. C9-99-2164, 2000 WL 781362, at *1-4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2000). 
 101. Id. at *1. 
 102. Id. at *2. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at *3. 
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troubled about the contact and had more than a vague sense of 
shame.”105  In regard to John Doe 28A, the court concluded that 
after the abuse, he (plaintiff) “felt that Father Liles had breached 
their friendship and trust.”106  As further evidence, the court stated 
that John Doe 28A “was upset, embarrassed and ashamed of the 
sexual encounters.”107 
The court relied on Blackowiak for the rule that “one is injured 
if one is sexually abused.”108  Accordingly, the court held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations because 
they “knew or should have known that their injuries were caused by 
sexual abuse six years prior to commencing litigation in 1997.”109 
The court’s reliance on the fact that John Doe 28A felt guilt 
and shame at the time of the abuse as evidence that he knew he was 
abused was misplaced.  Guilt and shame are two of the very 
emotions that the legislature recognized were experienced by 
childhood abuse victims and that it was these emotions that made it 
extremely difficult for victims to discover the connection between 
the childhood sexual abuse and their resulting injuries.110  
Nonetheless, the court virtually disregarded the delayed discovery 
statute and determined that the very emotional difficulties that 
cause delayed discovery for abuse victims—difficulties that led to 
the statute being enacted in the first place—somehow trigger the 
immediate running of the statute.111 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *2 (citing Blackowiak, 536 N.W.2d at 3). 
 109. Id. at *3-4. The evidence relating to John Doe 28A does not follow the 
standard cited by the court that the evidence must be “review[ed] in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.”  Id. at *2 (citing Fabio 
v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993)).  Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to John Doe 28A would lead to the conclusion that he did not 
begin to recognize the abuse until 1991, and did not even put a face to who 
abused him until sometime after 1991.  John Doe 28B, 2000 WL 781362, at *2.  
Whether or not the court believes these facts are true does not bear on the 
summary judgment motion.  See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3 (stating that the issue 
of when the statute of limitations is triggered is generally a fact issue for the jury 
unless there is overwhelming evidence).  These facts are sufficient to raise a fact 
question for the jury as to when John Doe 28A first realized that he was abused.  
Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “[w]here 
there are disputed questions of material fact as to whether a plaintiff is barred by a 
statute of limitation, these questions are to be decided by a jury”). 
 110. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680 n.5 (generally citing Hearing on S.F. 315 
Before the Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989)). 
 111. See John Doe 28B, 2000 WL 781362, at *4. 
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As evidenced by these four cases, there was still much 
confusion in the application of the Minnesota delayed discovery 
statute after Blackowiak and Bugge.  Specifically, under Blackowiak, it 
remained unclear whether a minor plaintiff could trigger the 
statute of limitations before he or she reached the age of 
majority.112  Also, if the statute of limitations did not begin to run 
until majority, it was unclear whether the plaintiff had until age 
twenty-four or twenty-five to bring a claim.113  Finally, it was unclear 
whether the Blackowiak court and its progeny effectively had read 
the causation and personal injury elements out of the delayed 
discovery statute.114 
V. D.M.S. V. BARBER 
A.  Facts 
D.M.S. was born on September 10, 1979.115  In August or 
September 1992, D.M.S. was placed in the home of Kennedy 
Barber, a foster parent, by the Professional Association of 
Treatment Homes (PATH).116  Barber was licensed as a foster-care 
provider in October 1990 at the recommendation of PATH.117  
Thereafter, PATH was responsible for supervising and evaluating 
Barber and making recommendations whether to grant or revoke 
his foster-care license.118  On February 22, 1993, D.M.S. reported to 
a social worker that Barber was acting suspiciously toward him and 
other children.119  D.M.S. was removed from the Barber home that 
day.120  Later, D.M.S. alleged that Barber had repeatedly sexually 
abused him during the five months that he was in Barber’s care.121  
 
 112. See Gibbons v. Krowech, No. C4-95-2435, 1996 WL 422513, at *2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. July 30, 1996) (citing Blackowiak). 
 113. Compare Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681-82, and Bertram, 597 N.W.2d at 313-14, 
with J.J., 578 N.W.2d at 21. 
 114. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681-82; Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. 
 115. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 385. 
 116. Id.  PATH is a non-profit private agency licensed in Minnesota to provide 
foster home placement for children unable to remain in their current living 
situation.  Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  At least three other persons have pursued legal actions against Barber 
and PATH for sexual abuse.  D.M.S. v. Barber, 627 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 120. Id. 
 121. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 386. 
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Specifically, D.M.S. alleged that Barber gave him uncomfortably 
long hugs shortly after he arrived at Barber’s home and these 
uncomfortable hugs led to kissing, fondling, and eventually oral 
sex.122  D.M.S. stated that initially he felt like he was in a “daze” and 
“didn’t understand it [the abuse].”123  Over time he felt “used,” 
“like a piece of meat or something” and often had a sick feeling in 
his stomach and “just felt bad.”124 
On June 8, 1999, D.M.S. served PATH with a summons and 
complaint, alleging that PATH was liable to D.M.S. under the 
theories of respondeat superior, negligent hiring, negligent 
retention, negligent supervision, negligent failure to investigate 
and failure to act upon prior allegations of sexual misconduct 
against Barber, and negligent placement of D.M.S. in Barber’s 
care.125  The district court granted PATH’s motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that D.M.S.’s negligence-based claims 
were barred by the six-year statute of limitations contained in the 
delayed discovery statute.126  The district court also held that the 
delayed discovery statute did not apply to D.M.S.’s respondeat 
superior claim and also that the two-year statute of limitations in 
Minnesota Statute Section 541.07(1) (2000) barred this claim.127  
D.M.S. appealed.128 
B.  Court of Appeals’ Decision 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to 
dismiss D.M.S.’s claims based on the statute of limitations.129  In so 
doing, the court reaffirmed Blackowiak’s conclusions that “one is 
injured if one is sexually abused” and that “[t]he victim is 
immediately put on notice of the causal connection between the 
 
 122. Id.  D.M.S. also alleged that he had two additional sexual encounters with 
Barber after he was removed from Barber’s home.  Id. at 386 n.1.  The additional 
abuse allegedly occurred once in Barber’s car and once in Barber’s home, which 
was still a PATH foster home at the time.  D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 371.  Both the 
district court and the court of appeals held that PATH had no duty to protect 
D.M.S. after he left PATH’s care on February 22, 1993.  D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 386 
n.1.  The issue was not raised on appeal.  Id. 
 123. Id. (citing D.M.S.’s deposition). 
 124. Id. (citing D.M.S.’s deposition). 
 125. Id.  D.M.S. also named Barber in the complaint as well, but the claims 
against Barber were not before the court on appeal.  Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 541.07(1) (2002). 
 128. D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 371. 
 129. Id. 
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abuse and the injury so that the statute of limitations begins to run 
once the victim is abused.”130  The court stated that the D.M.S. 
situation was “almost identical” to the situation in J.J. v. Luckow.131  
The J.J. court held that the plaintiff’s action was barred because he 
failed to bring his claim within six years of the time at which he 
realized that the perpetrator’s conduct was improper.132 
As in J.J., the court of appeals found that D.M.S. knew of the 
abuse outside of the six-year statutory period.133  Accordingly, the 
court held that the statute of limitations for D.M.S.’s claims began 
to run when he became aware of the abuse, at age thirteen.134  The 
court of appeals also concluded that D.M.S.’s claim of respondeat 
superior was barred by a two-year statute of limitations.135  Here, the 
court concluded that the statute of limitations for a claim of 
respondeat superior is the same as the statute of limitations for the 
underlying tort upon which the claim is based.136  In the case of 
sexual abuse, the court determined that the underlying tort was an 
intentional tort and therefore the statute of limitations for a claim 
of respondeat superior, here, was the same as it is for an intentional 
tort: two-years.137 
C.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Reversal of the Court of Appeals 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals 
and held that D.M.S.’s claims against PATH were timely under the 
delayed discovery statute.138  D.M.S. brought his action against 
PATH when he was nineteen years old.139  PATH argued that 
because D.M.S. reported the abuse when he was thirteen, D.M.S. 
necessarily knew at that point that he had been sexually abused.140  
Applying Blackowiak, PATH asserted that the statute of limitations 
 
 130. Id. at 373. 
 131. Id. 
 132. J.J., 578 N.W.2d at 20. 
 133. D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 374. 
 134. Id.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the 
statute of limitations began to run for D.M.S.’s negligence claims on February 22, 
1993, the day on which D.M.S. reported the abuse to a social worker.  Id. at 373-74. 
 135. Id. at 374.  The court based its decision on the conclusion that the claim 
was based on an intentional tort, even though the court acknowledged that the 
pertinent statute of limitations is the one attached to the underlying claim.  Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389-91. 
 139. Id. at 390. 
 140. Id. at 387. 
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on D.M.S.’s claims began to run when he was thirteen and were 
time barred on D.M.S.’s nineteenth birthday.141  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court, however, concluded that “reading the delayed 
discovery statute in this way would defeat its purpose and render 
the statute meaningless for children.”142  The court held that 
[a]s a matter of law, a reasonable child is incapable of 
knowing that he or she has been sexually abused and, 
absent some other disability that serves to delay the 
running of the statute of limitations, the six-year period of 
limitation under the delayed discovery statute begins to 
run when the victim reaches the age of majority.143 
In addition, the court held that the delayed discovery statute also 
applied to the respondeat superior claim, because it was based on 
the case of sexual abuse, which was governed by the delayed 
discovery statute.144 
In reaching this conclusion, the court extensively discussed its 
decisions in Bugge and Blackowiak.145  The court reaffirmed 
Blackowiak’s holding that “as a matter of law one is ‘injured’ if one is 
sexually abused” and that the “ultimate question” posed by the 
delayed discovery statute is “the time at which the complainant 
knew or should have known that he/she was sexually abused.”146  
D.M.S. also reaffirmed Bugge’s holding that “this question is 
answered by the application of the objective, reasonable person 
standard.”147  The court, however, recognized that it had 
improperly applied the delayed discovery statute in Bugge.148  The 
court held that the delayed discovery statute begins to run at age 
eighteen, when the disability ends, not at age nineteen as the Bugge 
court concluded.149 
Justices Stringer and Anderson both dissented, arguing for a 
strict statutory interpretation of the delayed discovery statute.150  
They reasoned that because the delayed discovery statute explicitly 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 390. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 391. 
 145. Id. at 387-93. 
 146. Id. at 387 (citing Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3). 
 147. Id. (citing Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681). 
 148. Id. at 389 n.5.  In Bugge, the court concluded that based on MINN. STAT. § 
541.073 (2000) and MINN. STAT. § 541.15(a) (2000), plaintiff had six years from 
the date of her nineteenth birthday to commence her action.  573 N.W.2d at 682. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 391-93. 
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states that Minnesota Statutes section 541.15(a) is unaffected by the 
delayed discovery statute,151 D.M.S.’s claims were barred on his 
nineteenth birthday.152 
D.  Analysis of the D.M.S. Decision 
The court in D.M.S. had the opportunity to follow the delayed 
discovery statute’s clear language to establish the correct standard 
for courts to apply when deciding a statute of limitations issue in a 
case of childhood sexual abuse and to thereby overrule its previous 
erroneous Blackowiak and Bugge decisions.  Instead, the court 
attempted to clarify that under the Blackowiak rule as a matter of 
law a child is unable to recognize that he or she was abused.153  This 
“clarification” strays even further from the language of the delayed 
discovery statute.  Moreover, the court’s affirmation of Blackowiak 
effectively bars an opportunity at justice for many survivors who are 
over the age of twenty-four.154  The court’s misguided analysis in 
Blackowiak allows child abusers and those responsible for putting 
child abusers in positions of authority to continue to hide behind 
the statute of limitations when the clear language of the delayed 
discovery statute demands that victims be given an opportunity to 
show that they were unable to discover 1) the sexual abuse, 2) the 
resulting injury, and 3) that the injury was caused by the sexual 
abuse.155 
1.  Narrow Holding Based On D.M.S. Facts 
The narrow holding of D.M.S., that a survivor of childhood 
sexual abuse has until at least age twenty-four to bring a claim, at 
the very least, does not use the erroneous Blackowiak standard to 
penalize survivors of sexual abuse who are under the age of twenty-
four.156  Because Blackowiak held that one is injured if one is 
sexually abused, survivors of childhood abuse who were under the 
age of twenty-four were in danger of a court examining the facts 
and determining that the child knew that he or she was abused 
 
 151. MINN. STAT. § 541.073(2)(d). 
 152. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 391-93 (stating that the language of MINN. STAT. § 
541.15(a) (2000) clearly states that in no case should the statute be tolled past the 
plaintiff’s nineteenth birthday where the disability of minority is alleged). 
 153. Id. at 390. 
 154. See id. at 387. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390. 
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before he or she turned the age of majority.157  Under this 
reasoning, the court of appeals in D.M.S held that the statute of 
limitations began to run on D.M.S.’s claims when he was only 
thirteen years old because D.M.S., at that age, reported the abuse 
to a counselor and therefore knew he was abused.158  The supreme 
court, however, held that “as a matter of law, a reasonable child is 
incapable of knowing that he or she has been sexually abused.”159  
This holding may have resulted from a judicial recognition that 
under the harsh Blackowiak standard the delayed discovery statute 
would be almost meaningless for children.160  This band-aid 
approach, while beneficial to a small class of victims, continues to 
ignore the root of the problem—the erroneous Blackowiak decision 
itself. 
Although the D.M.S. narrow holding prevents certain survivors 
from being barred by the Blackowiak rule, like Blackowiak it is not 
legally defensible.161  The delayed discovery statute does not either 
expressly or impliedly state that the statute of limitations cannot 
begin to run before the victim reaches the age of majority.162  
Rather, the statute plainly states that the statute of limitations 
should begin to run when the “plaintiff knows or has reason to 
know that his or her personal injury was caused by sexual abuse.”163  
In some cases this discovery could be at the time of the abuse.  In 
most cases, however, it is much later.  Regardless, the statute should 
be applied as it was written and intended.164 
2.  Broad Holding Based Upon Blackowiak Standard 
The tragic part of the D.M.S. decision is the broad holding, in 
which the court reaffirmed its erroneous statutory construction in 
Blackowiak.165  The D.M.S. court stated that in Blackowiak, “[w]e 
observed that ‘as a matter of law one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually 
 
 157. See D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 374; Gibbons v. Krowech, 1996 WL 422513, at 
*2. 
 158. D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 374. 
 159. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Compare D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390, with MINN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2(a) 
(2002). 
 162. See § 541.073. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Am. Tower, L.P., v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001); 
Duluth Fireman’s Relief Ass’n v. City of Duluth, 361 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 
1985). 
 165. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389. 
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abused,’ and stated that the ‘ultimate question’ posed by the 
delayed discovery statute is the ‘time at which the complainant 
knew or should have known that he/she was sexually abused.’”166 
This insistence on affirming Blackowiak is problematic for 
numerous reasons.  First, Blackowiak relied on Fireman’s Fund,167 a 
vastly different case.168  The Fireman’s Fund situation appears similar 
to that in Blackowiak because both involved the sexual abuse of 
children.169  These cases, however, examined vastly different legal 
questions.  The Fireman’s Fund court solely examined whether a 
sexual molester could avoid the intentional acts exclusion in a 
liability insurance policy and thus receive coverage for the damages 
resulting from his sexual abuse.170  That decision did not examine 
the injury that the victim suffered, the time at which the victim 
realized that he was abused, the time at which the victim discovered 
that his injuries were caused by the childhood sexual abuse, or any 
other issue pertinent to the delayed discovery statute.171  On the 
other hand, the issue before the Blackowiak court was the time at 
which the victim, not the perpetrator, realized that the injury was 
caused by the childhood sexual abuse.172  The delayed discovery 
statute does not involve any inquiry into the perpetrator’s intent to 
injure.173   
The second problem with the Blackowiak standard is that it 
clearly does not comport with the unambiguous language of the 
delayed discovery statute.174  The issue under the delayed discovery 
statute is not when the victim was abused or even when the victim 
was injured.  Rather, the issue is when the plaintiff knew or had 
reason to know that he or she was 1) sexually abused, 2) personally 
injured, and 3) that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.175  
The majority in Blackowiak, and subsequently in Bugge and D.M.S, at 
a minimum disregarded the first and third elements of the delayed 
discovery statute, personal injury and causation, narrowing the 
statute such that the only requirement is knowledge of the sexual 
 
 166. Id. at 387, 
 167. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834, 834-835 (Minn. 1982). 
 168. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W2d at 3. 
 169. See id. at 2; Fireman’s Fund, 314 N.W.2d at 834. 
 170. Fireman’s Fund, 314 N.W.2d at 834-35. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 2-3. 
 173. See MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (2002). 
 174. Compare MINN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2(a), with Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 
3. 
 175. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4 (Gardebring, J., dissenting). 
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abuse.176 
However, as Justice Gardebring noted, “[k]nowledge that 
sexual abuse occurred or even knowledge of the other prerequisite, 
personal injury . . . is not central; it is the link between them, the 
causation, one of the other, which must be considered in order to 
determine whether a lawsuit is within the limitations period.”177  In 
D.M.S., however, the court cited Blackowiak for the ultimate inquiry 
regarding the statute of limitations under the delayed discovery 
statute: when is “the time at which the complainant knew or should 
have known that he/she was sexually abused.”178  This standard 
makes no inquiry whatsoever into either the explicit causation 
element or the explicit knowledge of personal injury element of 
the delayed discovery statute.179 
The Minnesota Legislature explicitly mandated that “when 
words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear 
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be 
disregarded.”180  Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court itself has 
long declared that “a statute is to be construed, if possible, so that 
no word, phrase, or sentence is superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.”181  The Blackowiak court, and by extension the Bugge 
and D.M.S. courts, did not follow either the legislature’s clear 
cannons of statutory construction or even its own precedent that 
every word in a statute should be given meaning in 
interpretation.182  Rather, the court took on the role of legislator by 
judicially amending the clear language of the delayed discovery 
statute from “knew or had reason to know that the injury was 
caused by the sexual abuse” to “knew or should have known that 
he/she was sexually abused.”183 
The third reason that the Blackowiak standard is problematic is 
that it is built on the assumption that “concepts of sexual abuse and 
injury within the meaning of the [delayed discovery] statute are 
 
 176. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3 (holding that “while the manifestation and 
form of the injury is significant to the victim, it is simply not relevant to the 
ultimate question of the time at which the complainant knew or should have 
known that he/she was sexually abused”); Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681-82 (citing 
Blackowiak); D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 387 (citing Blackowiak). 
 177. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4. 
 178. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 387 (citing Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3). 
 179. See id. 
 180. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2001). 
 181. Duluth Fireman’s, 361 N.W.2d at 385. 
 182. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. 
 183. Compare Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3, with MINN. STAT § 541.073 subd. 2. 
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essentially one and the same, not separable.”184  Although it is a 
reasonable assertion that on some level every victim of sexual abuse 
is injured at some point,185 the sexual abuse and the injury are still 
separable.186  The abuse occurs at specific times, locations, and in a 
certain manner.  However, the injury can take on vastly different 
forms and can manifest itself at different times throughout the 
victim’s life.  Often, these victims will not even know until years 
later that the injury they are experiencing is related to the sexual 
abuse they suffered years before.187 
This assumption of the injury and the sexual abuse being non-
separable also implies that all victims are immediately injured [for 
purposes of the delayed discovery statute].188  This inference is not 
reasonable for two reasons.  First, the legislative intent behind the 
delayed discovery statute clearly recognized that “repressed 
memory, denial, shame, and other similar factors may prevent 
sexual abuse victims from coming forward with actions against their 
alleged abusers in a timely fashion.”189  This intent clearly 
recognizes that the injury is not immediate.  Second, the inference 
is not reasonable in light of the reality that victims of childhood 
sexual abuse often do not experience the injury until years later or 
more often are not able to associate the injury with its cause, the 
childhood sexual abuse, until years later.190 
The fourth reason the D.M.S. court’s approval of Blackowiak is 
problematic is because it violates the spirit behind the delayed 
discovery statute. The legislature created the delayed discovery 
 
 184. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. 
 185. See REINERT, supra note 11, at 36-37, 52; see also MUFSON ET AL., supra note 
20, at 75 (listing various effects of sexual abuse); REIN, supra note 6, at 71-72 
(discussing various studies which examined effects of childhood sexual abuse); 
KRITSBERG, supra note 22, at 56-57 (listing secondary effects of sexual abuse). 
 186. See Shirley v. Reif, 920 P.2d 405, 413-14 (Kan. 1996) (holding that 
knowledge of sexual abuse alone is not enough without discovery that the abuse 
was the cause of the victim’s injuries). 
 187. See HYDE & FORSYTH, supra note 8, at 47 (noting that often times victims of 
childhood sexual abuse do not manifest any injury until later in adulthood); see 
also HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59. 
 188. See D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389 (stating that in Blackowiak “we said nothing 
more than . . . the victim is immediately put on notice of the causal connection 
between the abuse and the injury”). 
 189. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680 n.5 (generally citing Hearing on S.F. 315 
Before the Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989)). 
 190. See generally HYDE & FORSYTH, supra note 8, at 47 (stating that 
“[s]ometimes there are no symptoms [of childhood sexual abuse] until later in 
life”); see also HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59. 
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statute in recognition that victims of sexual abuse should be given a 
unique statute of limitations that would allow for recovery years 
after the abuse occurred.191  The “purpose of the original bill was to 
amend the statute of limitations for sexual abuse cases so that it 
would begin to run (1) when the abuse was committed, or (2) at 
the time the victim knew or had reason to know he or she was 
injured by the sexual abuse.”192  Tragically, the Blackowiak standard 
only supports the first portion of the legislature’s purpose and does 
not allow the victim the benefit of the clear statutory mandate that 
the statute of limitations only begins to run when the victim had 
reason to know that the abuse caused the injury.193  Had the 
legislature intended the statute of limitations to run when the 
abuse occurred there would have been no reason to include the 
second purpose and virtually no reason to enact the statute at all. 
D.M.S.’s approval of Blackowiak is also problematic because 
Blackowiak has consistently been cited as support to begin the 
statute of limitations whenever the victim feels shame and guilt 
about the abuse.194  However, as Justice Gardebring pointed out, 
“[s]hame is not the same as knowledge that sexual abuse caused 
injury.”195  The very nature of childhood sexual abuse makes 
survivors feel shameful and confused about what happened to 
them.196  Shame and guilt are feelings of personal fault, not 
victimization.  These feelings cause victims to not understand that 
they have been abused, and thus fail to report the abuse.  Further, 
these feelings generally arise at the time of the abuse itself, 
meaning that there almost always would be some indication that 
the survivor had been abused, triggering the statute of limitations 
 
 191. See MINN. STAT. § 541.073; see also Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680 n.5 (generally 
citing Hearing on S.F. 315 Before the Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary 
Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989) as recognition that “repressed memory, denial, shame, and 
other similar factors may prevent sexual abuse victims from coming forward with 
actions against their alleged abusers in a timely fashion”). 
 192. Greenwood Brown, supra note 39, at 421 (citing Tape of Legislative 
Proceedings, Criminal Justice Div. of the House Judiciary Comm. of the Minn. 
House of Representatives, H.F. No. 461 (Feb. 28, 1989)). 
 193. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. 
 194. See J.J. v. Luckow, 578 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); see also Doe 
28B v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, No. C9-99-2164, 2000 WL 781362, 
at *3-4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2000); Gibbons v. Krowech, No. C4-95-2435, 1996 
WL 422513, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 30, 1996). 
 195. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4. 
 196. See Ross v. Garabedian, 742 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (Mass. 2001) (holding that 
knowledge of wrongfulness and the feeling of shame were not sufficient to trigger 
the delayed discovery statute). 
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under Blackowiak.197  Additionally, the coping mechanisms that 
many of these survivors implement to combat the feelings of shame 
and guilt and the many other effects of childhood sexual abuse are 
the very mechanisms which prevent the survivors from being able 
to realize the cause of their injuries.198  Survivors often deny that 
the abuse ever happened, are unable to connect the source of their 
injuries to the abuse, repress the abuse, or simply do not allow 
themselves to feel the painful psychological effects of the abuse.199  
Often, it is not until years later that many survivors are able to 
stabilize their lives and uncover the effects of their childhood 
sexual abuse through the painful process of breaking their coping 
mechanisms.200  None of these realities are recognized in 
Blackowiak.201  Essentially, the Blackowiak standard takes some of the 
very reasons that the legislature enacted the delayed discovery 
statute—survivors often deny that they were abused and feel 
shameful—to trigger the statute of limitations.202 
 
 197. See HANCOCK & MAINS, supra note 14, at 32 (recognizing that the theme of 
guilt shows up often in survivors’ lives and is often carried with the survivors). 
 198. See KRITSBERG, supra note 22, at 48, 56-57 (describing the coping 
mechanisms employed by many survivors of childhood sexual abuse and how these 
mechanisms affect the survivors’ lives). 
 199. See Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179, 1183 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing 
that many victims of sexual abuse “develop amnesia because of the horrible nature 
of the abuse”); Hollmann v. Corcoran, 949 P.2d 386, 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating that the Washington Legislature explicitly enacted the delayed discovery 
statute in recognition of possible memory repression, sexual abuse victims’ 
difficulty in understanding the causal connection between the abuse and the 
injury, and the fact that victims will often suffer more serious injuries many years 
after the first recognition of the causal connection). 
 200. See generally HYDE & FORSYTH, supra note 8, at 47 (stating that 
“[s]ometimes there are no symptoms [of childhood sexual abuse] until later in 
life”). 
 201. A common argument for a harsh standard is that without it there would 
be a “flood of litigation.”  See, e.g., S.E. v. Shattuck-St. Mary’s School, 533 N.W.2d 
628, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that “to avoid a flood of claims there 
must be a reasonable and definitive standard” for claims of childhood sexual 
abuse under the delayed discovery statute).  Even if there were additional claims 
this policy is weak because “[i]t is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that 
deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood of litigation,’ and it is a pitiful 
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on 
such grounds.”  W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 12, at 56 (5th ed. 1984) (basing statement on potential flood of emotional 
distress claims). 
 202. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3; Greenwood Brown, supra note 39, at 421 
(citing Tape of Legislative Proceedings, Criminal Justice Div. of the House 
Judiciary Comm. of the Minn. House of Representatives, H.F. No. 461 (Feb. 28, 
1989)). 
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E.  Effects of the D.M.S. Decision 
1.  Survivors Under Age Twenty-Four 
The main effect of the D.M.S. decision is that there is now no 
question that, under the current Minnesota law, survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse have until at least age twenty-four to bring 
a claim based upon that abuse.203 
2.  Survivors Over Twenty-Four 
The D.M.S. court was not confronted with the situation where 
the plaintiff was over twenty-four years of age.204  However, the 
court does approvingly cite Blackowiak’s rewriting of the statute for 
the proposition that the delayed discovery statute begins to run 
when the victim knows or reasonably should have known that he or 
she was abused.205  Under this interpretation, victims of childhood 
sexual abuse who are over age twenty-four have little chance of 
prevailing over the statute of limitations in order to get to the 
merits of their claim unless he/she can prove some mental 
disability that prevented recognition of the abuse.206  A mental 
disability that would apparently suffice is memory repression.207  
Another theory that should overcome the Blackowiak rule is the 
victim’s delayed discovery that he or she was a victim and that what 
occurred was the perpetrator’s or entity’s fault and not the victim’s 
fault.208 
 
 203. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390. 
 204. See id. at 383-93. 
 205. See id. at 387. 
 206. See, e.g., Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 1-3; Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 677-82. 
 207. See D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389.  D.M.S. did not affect the Minnesota 
common law rule that memory repression is a mental disability that tolls the 
statute of limitations.  See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681 (stating that memory 
repression would toll the statute of limitations); Bertram, 597 N.W.2d at 312-14 
(remanding case for determination of whether the plaintiffs suffered from 
repressed memory syndrome).  The D.M.S. court did not explicitly discuss the 
issue of memory repression, but the court did cite Bugge for the proposition that 
“the statute of limitations begins to run once a victim is abused unless there is 
some legal disability, such as the victim’s age, or mental disability, such as 
repressed memory of the abuse.”  D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389.  This clearly states 
that the court would recognize memory repression as a mental disability that 
would toll the statute of limitations.  See id. 
 208. See id.; Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.  Because the court erroneously 
focuses on the victim’s personal feelings of fault—shame and guilt—it is unlikely 
that the court would recognize these feelings are actually signs that should serve to 
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3.  Entities’ Negligence and Fraudulent Concealment When 
Survivor Had No Previous Knowledge 
a.  Negligence 
Even though many victims of clergy abuse did not know until 
recently that church officials often had knowledge of certain 
perpetrators’ dangerous propensities toward children before the 
victims were abused, the delayed discovery statute continues to bar 
many meritorious claims.209  The statute states that it applies to 
actions against “a person who . . . negligently permit[s] sexual 
abuse against the plaintiff to occur.”210  This part of the delayed 
discovery statute combined with the judicially-made Blackowiak rule 
means that as soon as a victim of sexual abuse had reason to know 
that he or she was abused, the victim somehow should also have 
known that church officials were responsible.211  However, it is 
unreasonable to put victims on such notice.  As unthinkable as it 
was until recently that a significant number of priests abused 
children, it was even more unfathomable that church leaders 
knowingly moved the dangerous priests around and allowed them 
to have further opportunities to abuse children.  It is absurd to 
charge survivors, when they do discover that they were abused, with 
the knowledge that an entity, such as the church, was negligent 
when almost no one in our society would have believed or would 
have had reason to believe that certain church officials were 
responsible prior to six months ago.212 
b.  Fraudulent Concealment 
A claim of fraudulent concealment should toll the delayed 
discovery statute.  The only purpose of fraudulent concealment is 
 
toll the Blackowiak rule because the victim has not truly realized that he or she was 
abused. 
 209. See MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (3) (2002). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id.; Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. 
 212. It is arguable that if a victim knew all three elements of the delayed 
discovery statute (injury, abuse, and causation), that he or she could have sued 
based on the employment of the perpetrator (respondeat superior) and found out 
through discovery what the church officials knew.  However, this argument places 
too great of a burden on a victim, most of whom did not think any higher ranking 
church officials were at fault and would thus not have been inclined to sue the 
church officials. 
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to prevent a victim from realizing either that they have been 
injured or who caused that injury.  Although the fraudulent 
concealment did not cause the injury (though it may aggravate the 
injury) because the abuse had already occurred, it is an intentional 
effort to prevent a victim from realizing that an entity was a cause 
of the injury.  Those responsible for the concealment should not 
then be allowed to hide behind a statute of limitations after their 
active concealment made it practically impossible for a victim to 
seek justice against this entity before the statute of limitations ran.  
This is the very reason that the Minnesota Supreme Court applied 
the rule in the first place.213  The court concluded: 
[O]ne who cannot assert his right because the necessary 
knowledge is improperly kept from him is not within the 
mischief the statute was intended to remedy; but is within 
the spirit of the law that restrains its operation. . . . Fraud 
is bad, it should not be permitted to go unchecked 
anywhere, and justice should always be able to penetrate 
its armor.214 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has apparently not addressed 
the specific issues of whether the delayed discovery statute of 
limitations applies to a claim of fraudulent concealment or what, if 
any, statute of limitations does apply to these claims.215  The court 
did, however, deal with fraudulent concealment in a similar 
situation in Wild v. Rarig.216  Here, the plaintiff alleged that he did 
not know that defamatory material had been published about him 
because of fraudulent concealment.217  The court held that 
fraudulent concealment would toll the statute of limitations.218  The 
court indicated that although there “is no categorical definition of 
what constitutes fraudulent concealment,” the doctrine generally 
would apply where there is a concealment that is fraudulent or 
intentional and a fiduciary relationship exists between the 
parties.219  In the cases now coming to light, we know that not all of 
 
 213. Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 40, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (1931). 
 214. Id. at 40-41, 235 N.W. at 634. 
 215. See D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d 383, 383-93 (Minn. 2002); W.J.L. v. 
Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677, 677-84 (Minn. 1998); Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 1-5. 
 216. 302 Minn. 419, 450, 234 N.W.2d 775, 795 (Minn. 1975) (holding that 
there was a fact question about whether the defendant fraudulently concealed a 
defamatory publication and concluding that fraudulent concealment would toll 
the statute of limitations). 
 217. Id. at 448, 234 N.W.2d at 793. 
 218. Id. at 450, 234 N.W.2d at 795. 
 219. See id. (citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 206f, for the proposition 
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the concealment of the church officials’ knowledge was due to 
simple negligence.  More often the church officials made a 
concerted effort to conceal that they had any idea that a specific 
priest or brother was dangerous prior to the abuse.  The 
relationship between church priests and parishioners of the church 
is “as clearly fiduciary as any relationship between two individuals in 
our society.  To hold otherwise would deny the morality and the 
purpose of religious institutions.”220 
VI. OTHER STATES’ TREATMENT OF CIVIL CLAIMS FOR  
CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE 
In addition to Minnesota,221 nineteen states have enacted 
causation-focused delayed discovery statutes, under which the 
limitations period begins to run when the survivor realizes that his 
or her injuries were caused by childhood sexual abuse.222  Other 
states have enacted non-causation delayed discovery statutes, where 
the limitations period starts on the discovery of an event other than 
causation.223  Some states have enacted statutes that run for a 
specific number of years after a plaintiff reaches the age of 
majority.224  Hawaii has recognized a common law delayed discovery 
 
that fraudulent concealment consists of a concealment that is fraudulent or 
intentional between fiduciaries). 
 220. Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn et al., 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 
668 (App. Div. 2000) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 221. See MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (2002). 
 222. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 subd. b1-2 (Michie 2001); CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 340.1 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11 (7) (2002); ILL. COMP. STAT.  ch. 735 § 
5/13-202.2 (2002); IOWA CODE § 614.8A (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (2002); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4C (2002); MINN. STAT. § 541.073; MO. REV. STAT. § 
537.046 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.215 
(2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61B-1 (2002); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 26-10-25 (Michie 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 
8.01-249 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.340 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
893.587 (2002). 
 223. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130 (Michie 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.249 
(Banks-Baldwin 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30 (Michie 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 15-3-40, 15-3-35 (Law. Co-op. 2002) & § 15-3-535 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
12-25.1 (2)(a)-(b) (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (b)(i-ii) (Michie 2002). 
 224. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-103.7 (1) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577d 
(2002); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301 & § 12-302 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33.1 (b) 
(2002); IDAHO CODE § 6-1704 (2002); IND. CODE § 34-11-2-4, § 34-11-6-1 (2002); LA. 
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3496.1 (2002); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-201 
(2002); MI. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805 (9) (2002) & § 600.5851 (1) (2002); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (2002) & § 15-1-59 (2002); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 (McKinney 
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rule.225  Maine enacted a statute for survivors of sexual abuse that 
states that “[a]ctions based upon sexual acts toward minors may be 
commenced at any time.”226  Finally, there are some states that 
unfortunately do not treat childhood sexual abuse any different 
than other wrongful acts or omissions for statute of limitation 
purposes.227 
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court effectively 
disregarded the explicit causation and personal knowledge of 
injury elements in the Minnesota delayed discovery statute in 
Blackowiak, Bugge, and D.M.S., courts from other states have 
correctly applied a causation delayed discovery statute.228  Werre v. 
David represents a particularly insightful examination of such a 
statute.229  In Werre, the Montana Supreme Court interpreted the 
state’s delayed discovery statute, which states that a plaintiff must 
bring a claim based upon the childhood sexual abuse “3 years after 
the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that 
the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse.”230  The 
plaintiff alleged that her stepfather sexually abused her when she 
 
2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17 (a) (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (2002) & § 
28-01-25 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (2002) & § 2305.16 (2002); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 95 & 12 § 96 (2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524 (2002) & § 
5533 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (2002) & §55-2-15 (2002). 
 225. See Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 196, 204 (Haw. 1996) (establishing 
delayed discovery doctrine in Hawaii). 
 226. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-
1-106, 28-3-104 (2002) (allowing one year for personal injury actions and tolling 
until age of majority); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 16.001, 16.003, 16.0045 (Vernon 
2002). 
 227. ALA. CODE § 6-2-38 (l) (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8119 (2001). 
 228. See Dunlea, 924 P.2d at 204 (holding that it is a fact question of whether a 
victim of childhood sexual abuse ascertained “her injuries and their causal link”); 
Shirley v. Reif, 920 P.2d 405, 413-14 (Kan. 1996)(holding that the jury should 
decide whether a victim of childhood sexual abuse’s claim is brought within three 
years of discovering that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the childhood 
sexual abuse); Ross v. Garabedian, 742 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (Mass. 2001) 
(concluding in a childhood sexual abuse case that the court will not grant 
summary judgment when it is “unclear whether, and to what extent, a plaintiff 
perceived a ‘causal connection’ between a defendant’s misconduct and the 
plaintiff’s alleged psychological harm”); Hollmann v. Corcoran, 949 P.2d 386, 392 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “[t]he statute of limitations is tolled until the 
victim of childhood sexual abuse in fact discovers the causal connection between 
the defendant’s act and the injuries for which the claim is brought”). 
 229. 913 P.2d 625, 630 (Mont. 1996) (holding that where there is conflicting 
evidence as to the time at which a victim of childhood sexual abuse knew of the 
causal connection between her injuries and the sexual abuse, the decision should 
be left to a jury). 
 230. Id. 
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was approximately twelve to fourteen years old.231  The court noted 
that there was conflicting evidence with regard to whether the 
plaintiff had or had not discovered the causal connection between 
the abuse and her injuries within three years of filing the 
complaint.232  Specifically, the plaintiff testified that more than 
three years before she brought suit she did not tell a male therapist 
about the sexual abuse because she distrusted men as a result of the 
abuse.233  The plaintiff also testified that more than three years 
before she brought suit, when she first saw a different therapist, she 
made some connection between her need for counseling and her 
childhood sexual abuse.234  However, the court noted that the 
plaintiff testified she did not connect her sexual abuse with her 
psychological problems until within three years of commencing 
suit.235  Further, a doctor testified that when he saw the plaintiff 
within three years of commencement of the suit, the plaintiff was 
still in the process of connecting the harm to the sexual abuse.236  
Accordingly, the court concluded that there were “substantial 
conflicts in the evidence regarding when [the plaintiff] discovered 
that her injuries were caused by the childhood sexual abuse she 
experienced.”237  The court held that this evidentiary conflict was a 
fact question for the jury and not appropriate for summary 
judgment.238 
The Werre decision is an insightful model for other courts 
applying a delayed discovery statute for at least two reasons.  First, 
the court correctly applied the plain language of the delayed 
discovery statute.  The court held to the specific words that the 
legislature enacted: discovery “that the injury was caused by the act 
of childhood sexual abuse.”239  The court did not arbitrarily decide 
that some of the words in the statute were unnecessary.240  Second, 
the court did not make decisions about the merits of either party’s 
 
 231. Id. at 629.  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that while her mother took 
the other children out for ice cream, the plaintiff’s stepfather gave her “sex 
education,” which included sexual intercourse.  Id.  She also alleged that after the 
incident, her stepfather fondled her on several occasions.  Id. 
 232. Id. at 630. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (emphasis added). 
 240. Id. 
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evidence.241  Rather, the court correctly viewed the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party and recognized that 
genuine issues of material fact existed, which precluded summary 
judgment.242  As a result, the court properly did not decide the case 
in favor of the plaintiff or defendant, but simply determined that 
the plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence to warrant that the case 
be presented to a jury.243 
VII. MOVEMENT TO ALLOW SURVIVORS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL 
ABUSE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RECOURSE 
As the church sex abuse scandal continues to unfold in the 
media around the country, both Connecticut and California have 
amended their civil statutes of limitations for survivors of childhood 
sexual abuse.  Also, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania and Washington all have bills under consideration 
that would change their statutes of limitation for claims of 
childhood sexual abuse.244  Both the Connecticut and California 
statutes serve as good examples for other states concerned about 
re-victimizing survivors of childhood sexual abuse through a harsh 
statute of limitations, while recognizing the unique problems that 
victims of childhood sexual abuse have in timely bringing their 
abuse to justice. 
A.  Connecticut 
The Connecticut statute of limitation for survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse was amended, effective May 23, 2002, to 
state: “no action . . . caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or 
sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. 
 244. S.B. 1286, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2003); H.B. 2457, 46th Leg., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2003); H.B. 1321, 105th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003);S.B. 1035, 93d 
Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2003); S.B. 893, 93d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2003); S.B. 51, Reg. Sess. 
(Ken. 2003); S.B. 68, 417th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md.  2003); H.B. 165, 417th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2003); S.B. 575, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003); 
H.B. 386, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003); S.B. 669, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Mo. 2003); H.B. 707, 158th Gen. Ct., 1st Year (N.H. 2003); S.B. 1421, 210th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2002); A.B. 5673, 226th Leg. (N.Y. 2003); S.B. 212, 185th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2002); H.B. 1040, 58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003). 
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from the date such person attains the age of majority.”245  This 
means that a survivor of sexual abuse has until age forty-eight to 
bring an action based upon childhood sexual abuse.246  One 
objective of this statute is to “afford a plaintiff sufficient time to 
recall and come to terms with traumatic childhood events before 
he or she must take action.”247  The Connecticut Legislature 
recognized that “minor victims of sexual assault often do not 
understand or recognize the damage which they have sustained 
until a substantial number of years after they attain majority.  In 
fact, it is not just two or three years, but can be substantially longer 
than that.”248 
This statute serves two important public policies.  First, it 
allows the survivors of sexual abuse ample time to recognize the 
effects of the abuse and its causal relationship, to break through 
the defense mechanisms that the survivor has employed to battle 
the effects of the abuse, and to gain the strength to take the 
courageous step of bringing an action against the perpetrator or 
entities responsible.249  Second, the thirty-year period provides a 
bright line rule for the courts to apply.  Thus, courts will simply 
have to assess whether the plaintiff filed his or her claim before he 
or she reached the age of forty-eight.  This promotes judicial 
efficiency and allows courts to focus more on the merits of the 
alleged claims rather than on procedural issues. 
B.  California 
In recognition of the ongoing sexual abuse scandal involving 
the clergy, the California Legislature, on July 11, 2002, amended its 
statute of limitation for actions based upon childhood sexual 
abuse.250  The legislature responded to growing confirmations that 
 
 245. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577d (2002) (amending the number of years for 
personal injury resulting from childhood abuse from seventeen years to thirty 
years). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Roberts v. Caton, 619 A.2d 844, 849 (1993) (basing statement on the 
prior amendment to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577d, which extended the statute of 
limitations from seven to seventeen years). 
 248. See id. at 849 n.8 (quoting Senator Anthony V. Avallone’s commentary 
before the Senate regarding the proposal to amend the statute of limitations for 
victims of childhood sexual abuse); see also HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59. 
 249. See generally Roberts, 619 A.2d at 849 (recognizing the legislative intent 
behind the previous expansion of the statute of limitations for actions based upon 
childhood sexual abuse). 
 250. S.B. 1779, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2002).  California Rule of Civil 
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church leaders and officials knowingly moved priests who were 
suspected of molesting children to other parishes where the priests 
still had unrestricted access to children, some of whom were 
abused by those very same priests.  The prior statute stated that an 
action against any entity for a negligent act could not be 
commenced after the plaintiff’s twenty-sixth birthday.251  The 
amendment provided that the statute of limitation would not bar a 
claim of personal injury by a survivor of sexual abuse, if brought 
within one year of January 1, 2003, against a 
[p]erson or entity [who] knew or had reason to know, or 
was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct 
by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and 
failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement 
reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual 
conduct in the future by that person, including, but not 
limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that 
person in a function or environment in which contact 
with children is an inherent part of that function or 
environment in which contact with children is an inherent 
part of that function or environment.  For purposes of this 
subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not 
sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step 
or reasonable safeguard.252 
This is a major development in the area of delayed discovery 
for two reasons.  First, it gives current survivors of childhood sexual 
abuse a chance for justice against an entity free of the re-victimizing 
constraints of a harsh statute of limitations if that entity had control 
over the perpetrator and knew or should have known or was 
otherwise on notice of the perpetrator’s past unlawful sexual 
conduct.253  Second, the statute provides clear guidelines for courts 
to apply.254  The statute explicitly includes many different types of 
agency relationships and explicitly provides that counseling of the 
perpetrator alone is not in itself a reasonable safeguard against 
childhood sexual abuse.255  This is important because it decreases 
 
Procedure section 340.1 previously stated that a victim of childhood sexual abuse 
had either eight years after reaching majority or three years after the plaintiff 
realized that the personal injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse.  CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (2002). 
 251. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(b)(2) (2002). 
 252. S.B. 1779, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2002). 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See id. 
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the possibility of judicial misinterpretation of the statute, thus 
making it straightforward for the courts to administer. 
In passing the amendment, the legislature recognized that 
many of the survivors of childhood abuse by priests had no idea 
until recently of church officials’ negligence and fraudulent 
concealment of the abuse and thus had no idea that they had a 
cause of action against these church officials.  Many statutes of 
limitation, including the previous California rule and possibly the 
current Minnesota statute, effectively bar many of these negligence 
claims against the church, even though until the recent clergy 
abuse scandal became public, most of the survivors never had any 
idea that the church was even negligent.256 
VIII. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
A.  Courts 
There are numerous things within the power of the courts that 
can be done to address the current child sexual abuse scandal in 
the church and to deter child abuse in the future.  First, the courts 
can apply the delayed discovery rule or applicable statute correctly.  
This means that if the delayed discovery statute or rule of that state 
mandates that it is the causal connection that triggers the statute of 
limitation, the court should apply this standard.  Specifically, for 
the Minnesota Supreme Court this means that it should overrule its 
clearly erroneous decision in Blackowiak.  Second, courts should 
properly apply summary judgment standards and view evidence 
relating to when the survivor made the causal connection between 
the abuse and the injury in the light most favorable to the survivor.  
This would allow the fact question to be decided where it is 
supposed to be decided—with the jury.  Third, courts should allow 
plaintiffs to make an offer of proof that an entity was negligent 
without the plaintiff’s knowledge and/or an offer of proof that the 
cause of action was fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff, to 
establish a factual question for determination by the jury.  Finally, 
courts in states having a delayed discovery statute should ascertain 
the clear legislative intent behind the delayed discovery statute and 
interpret any construed ambiguities in the pertinent delayed 
discovery statute to effectuate that intent. 
 
 256. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (2002). 
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B.  Legislatures 
In addition to courts, legislatures clearly need to respond to 
the ongoing church sexual abuse scandal, the greater realization 
that childhood sexual abuse has profound effects on its victims, and 
recognize the alarming prevalence of all child sex abuse, not just 
that involving clergy.  First, legislatures should examine or re-
examine the policies behind allowing a survivor of sexual abuse an 
extended statute of limitation.  When enacting or amending a 
statute dealing with childhood sexual abuse, legislatures must 
clearly express that its intentions are clear in the statute to limit the 
amount of “judicial interpretation” that is done.  Legislatures 
should also consider enacting or amending statutes in a manner 
similar to the Connecticut and/or California models.  Connecticut 
provides a bright line rule that is easy for judges to apply.  
California provides a clear response to the church abuse scandal. 
C.  Public 
The public has the opportunity to aid in the healing process of 
the survivors of childhood sexual abuse and encourage legislation 
to protect children.  As difficult as it may be to confront the issue, 
the public should educate itself about the prevalence and effects of 
sexual abuse.  More importantly, the public must stand side by side 
with survivors of sexual abuse and show their belief in, their 
support for, and a willingness to fight the issue with, those 
survivors. 
The public should also inform their legislators that they are 
outraged over child sexual abuse and feel that the laws should be 
changed to reflect the heinousness and lasting damage of the crime 
as well as the vital importance of deterring child sexual abuse in the 
future. 
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